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Nontechnical Summary
Environmental regulation schemes often entail some type of compensation to reduce the specific
costs for regulated industries. Since compensating mechanisms typically aim at the reduction of adverse
production and employment effects in these industries, there is an inherent trade-off for environmental
policy between the issue of efficiency and compensation.
In this paper, we analyze the efficiency-compensation trade-off for tradable permit systems where
emission allowances are freely allocated to energy-intensive sectors based on either emissions or output.
Combining theoretical partial equilibrium analysis with numerical general equilibrium analysis, we find
that the trade-off between efficiency and compensation in open trading systems crucially depends on the
level of the international permit price. The efficiency costs for ameliorating adverse production and
output effects in energy-intensive industries through output-based or emission-based allocation becomes
more costly, the higher the international permit price is. The costs reflect foregone gains from permit
trading because of permit imports that are too high or, likewise, permit exports that are too small
compared to the efficient volumes under auctioned permit systems.
In the open trading system, the output-based allocation rule is distinctly less costly than the
emission-based rule to preserve output and employment in energy-intensive sectors. Emission-based
allocation is particularly expensive towards higher international permit prices where the implicit subsidies
for emission use in energy-intensive sectors produce drastic efficiency losses since they imply high
expenditures for carbon permit imports rather than high net revenues from efficient carbon permit
exports. Only for small international permit prices is there a relatively small gap in cost-effectiveness (i.e.
efficiency costs for reduced production or employment frictions) between the output- and emission-based
rule.
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Abstract. Political feasibility of emission trading systems may crucially depend on the free initial
allocation of emission allowances to energy-intensive industries in order to ameliorate adverse production
and employment effects. We investigate the potential trade-off between such compensation and economic
efficiency for alternative allocation rules where emission allowances are based on either emissions or
output. Based on analytical partial equilibrium and numerical general equilibrium analysis, we show that
in open trading systems the trade-off becomes the more severe, the higher the international permit price
is. Whenever the permit price can be considered exogenous to firms or industries, the output-based
allocation rule is distinctly less costly than the emission-based rule to preserve output and employment in
energy-intensive sectors. The reason is that emission-based allocation of allowances not only provides an
implicit output subsidy but also lowers the effective price of emission inputs to regulated firms. Emission-
based allocation is particularly expensive towards higher international permit prices where the implicit
subsidies to emission use in energy-intensive sectors produce drastic efficiency losses, since they imply
high expenditures for carbon permit imports rather than high net revenues from efficient carbon permit
exports.
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11. Introduction
The theory of environmental policy has recommended market-based instruments, i.e. emission
taxes or tradable emission permits, on the grounds that they provide a cost-effective means of
environmental regulation. The more recent environmental policy design of OECD countries seems to
reflect the growing political reception of economic efficiency arguments for market-based instruments
(OECD 2001). A prominent example for the market-based course in environmental policy, is the SO2
permit trading scheme that has been implemented under the Clean Air Act during the 90ies in the USA to
achieve substantial cuts in nationwide SO2 emissions (Stavins 1998). In the more recent policy debate on
greenhouse gas abatement strategies, market-based instruments have further gained popularity vis-à-vis
the traditional command-and-control standards. Apart from the relative ease of designing an appropriate
tax or permit scheme for CO2 as the most important greenhouse gas, a major reason is the economy-wide
base of fossil-fuel use and the associated potentially large efficiency gains from equalizing marginal
abatement costs across sources. As a case in point, the European Commission issued a Directive for a
carbon trading system within the EU in order to meet its reduction commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol (EU 2001).
Economic efficiency can promote political feasibility of environmental regulation, since it may
substantially reduce the total adjustment costs. However – as with command-and-control standards –
political feasibility of market-based instruments depends crucially on the specific cost-incidence for
influential regulated parties. Rebating revenues from environmental policies in order to offset part of
adjustment costs to influential industries, therefore, has become a central element to the design of market-
based instruments. As for environmental taxation, nearly all schemes involve some form of rebate to dirty
industries (OECD 2001). Examples range from the Swedish NOx tax, where revenues are rebated to
affected power plants in proportion to the amount of energy produced to the design of broader green tax
reforms such as in Germany where energy-intensive industries are reimbursed tax payments beyond a
certain threshold. Likewise, the implementation of tradable permit systems has always been linked to a
free initial distribution of emission allowances rather than through a distribution through auctioning
(Stavins 1998). As a matter of fact, grandfathering of SO2 permits to electric utilities has been an
important element to the Clean Air Act (Burtraw 1999). In the same vein, the acceptance of the recent EU
Directive on carbon trade was approved by member states only under the condition that emission
allowances be freely allocated.
However, revenue rebating schemes which might be attractive in positive political economy terms
are typically problematic in normative efficiency terms. All policy-relevant rebating schemes involve the
imposition of a marginal cost on emissions with an implicit subsidy to output. As has been pointed out by
several authors (e.g. Böhringer, Ferris, and Rutherford 1998; Burtraw 1999; Fisher 2001), the latter
induces a trade-off between efficiency and compensation in environmental policy.
The aim of this paper is to substantiate this trade-off with quantitative evidence on alternative
allocation schemes that are currently considered by EU member states in the context of the EU emissions
2trading directive. Combining stylized partial equilibrium analysis with applied general equilibrium
simulations, our main insights can be summarized as follows:
• In a closed trading system, the emission-based allocation rule coincides with the socially efficient
solution. The output-based allocation rule ameliorates adverse impacts of emission constraints on
production and output of energy-intensive sectors, but this compensation comes at substantial
efficiency losses.
• In an open trading system, the output-based allocation rule is distinctly less costly than the emission-
based rule to preserve output and employment in energy-intensive sectors. Emission-based allocation
is particularly expensive for higher international permit prices. Here, the implicit subsidies for
emission use in energy-intensive sectors produce drastic efficiency losses since they imply high
expenditures for carbon permit imports rather than high net revenues from efficient carbon permit
exports.
• Only for small international permit prices is there a relatively small gap in cost-effectiveness (i.e.
efficiency costs for reduced production or employment frictions) between the output- and emission-
based rule.
• The trade-off between efficiency and compensation in open trading systems depends crucially on the
level of the international permit price. The efficiency costs for ameliorating adverse production and
output effects in energy-intensive industries through output-based or emission-based allocation
becomes more costly the higher the international permit price is. The costs reflect foregone gains
from permit trading because of permit imports that are higher than - or likewise permit exports that
are small than - the efficient volumes under auctioned permit systems.
The implications of initial permit allocation have been investigated in various numerical analyses.
Böhringer, Ferris, and Rutherford (1998) assess the use of free permits – allocated to sectors according to
benchmark emission shares – as a means to offset leakage from unilateral carbon abatement. From
simulations with a comparative-static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, they find that
grandfathering produces significant efficiency losses compared to auctioned permits because of implicit
distortionary output subsidies that are not outweighed by the decline in carbon leakage; at the sectoral
level, grandfathered permits are shown to be clearly beneficial to workers and capital owners in energy-
intensive industries. Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) deepen this distributional perspective in a dynamic
CGE model for Denmark. Their analysis confirms high efficiency costs of output-based permit allocation
to alleviate adverse adjustment effects of energy-intensive industries. Parry, Williams, and Goulder
(1997) highlight the importance of revenue-recycling in the presence of pre-existing tax distortions.
Reflecting the literature on “double dividends”, they stress the additional losses from environmental
policies that do not raise government revenues: The interaction with distortionary taxes make carbon
regulation more costly (“tax interaction effect”) while revenue-neutral cuts of taxes could ameliorate the
overall costs (“revenue-recycling effect”).
3Böhringer and Lange (2003) have developed a simple two-period partial equilibrium model to
determine general design rules for optimal dynamic free allocation schemes where the allocation of
allowances can be based on output or emission levels of the previous period. They derive second-best
allocation schemes based on both previous emissions and output that correspond to a Ramsey rule of
optimal tax differentiation: The more inelastic output (emissions) of a firm, the larger the weight to output
(emissions) in the allocation rule should be. However, in practice it will hardly be possible to apply such
differentiated rules and, thus, concrete policy advice requires the quantification of the economic
implications of simple uni-dimensional allocation schemes rather than mixed schemes.
Against this background, our analysis contributes to the literature in several respects. First, we
include emission-based approaches in the analysis of alternative allocation rules. Second, we investigate
how the economic implications across alternative permit allocation rules change if internal trading
schemes are opened to a large emission market with fully elastic supply and demand. This “open system”
perspective is particularly relevant in international climate policy given the provision of flexible
instruments under the Kyoto Protocol. Third, our numerical analysis reflects key aspects of the EU
Directive on a restricted permit market for carbon and thus provides potentially important policy insights.
It should be noted that we investigate the implications of emission- and output-based allocation
rules in a static (one-period) setting in which the assignment of allowances is based on firms’ current
production or emissions. The condensed representation captures the key economic incentives of dynamic
allocation schemes (such as the EU Directive) that take historical output or emission levels as a basis for
allowance allocation within continuous period-by-period planning. In fact, upcoming firms’ decisions will
determine the output or emission levels that are “historical” in subsequent periods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple analytical
partial equilibrium model to present the fundamental economic implications of alternative allocations
rules. Section 3 describes the numerical general equilibrium framework to quantify the consequences of
different allocation rules in a (more) realistic model economy based on empirical data. Section 4 presents
the policy simulations and interprets results. Section 5 offers policy conclusions.
2. Partial Equilibrium Analysis
In formulating the simple, one-sector partial equilibrium model, we follow the approach by
Fischer (2001). A representative firm is assumed to be price taker on both the product and emission
markets. Its unit production costs, c(µ) (decreasing, convex, differentiable), are constant in output but
depend on specific emissions µ=e/q. Inverse demand is given by P(q) (decreasing, differentiable).
Permissible allowance allocations are fixed by the regulator at some upper (optimal) bound E . We
distinguish two cases: (i) a closed emissions trading system where the price of emission allowances is
endogenously determined, and (ii) an open trading system where the price of emission allowances is
exogenously given, while it is endogenous in the closed system case.
42.1. The Closed System
In the closed emissions trading system the allowance price is endogenous and the total level of
emissions is given by E . The social planner aims to maximize welfare as the sum of consumer surplus
net of production costs:
0
( ) ( )
. .
= −
=

q
W P s ds c q
s t q E
µ
µ
(1)
This yields the following first-order conditions:
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Equation (2) states that at the optimal production level, the marginal benefit of another unit of
production must compensate for the social costs of producing another output unit. The shadow price of an
emission unit is given by '( )= −cτ µ . It determines the optimal emission rate such that the marginal
value of an additional emission unit (the marginal costs of the emission externality) equals the marginal
cost of emissions reduction. The optimal solution can easily be decentralized by imposing an explicit
emission tax at rateτ or by auctioning off the allowances E .
As stressed by the “double dividend” literature, the revenues that accrue from the taxation or
auctioning could be used to reduce some initial distortionary tax while keeping public good provision
constant. In this way, the direct cost of emission constraints – neglecting external costs – could be
reduced yielding the so-called weak double-dividend (Goulder 1995). Yet, the regulator may only be able
to gain political feasibility if revenues are directly rebated to regulated firms. For example, the EU
Directive on emissions trading prescribes the free allocation of allowances to energy-intensive firms as a
prerequisite for being approved from the EU member states.
From an efficiency point of view, lump-sum transfers which correspond to allocations of
allowances that do not depend on firm-specific decisions would be second-best. However, under
distributional equity, such transfers are most likely undesirable since they are typically channeled to
stakeholders in these industries without lowering adverse effects on employment (production), i.e.
workers’ displacement. Therefore, allowance allocation schemes as well as tax revenue rebating schemes
are usually linked to firms’ output or emission levels. Since both – output and emissions – are control
variables of the firm, the allocation of permits conditioned on output or emissions work as implicit output
subsidies that affect firms’ behavior and tend to reduce economic efficiency of the environmental policy.
In formal terms, if a firm’s allocation of allowances is specified as λqq for output-based and λeµq
for the emissions-based rules, the individual firm maximizes profits:
q e( ) ( )Π = − − + −Pq c q q q Eµ τ λ λ µ (3)
5In the closed system, the subsidy rates λe and λq are endogenous. In equilibrium, they satisfy
λe= E /µq and λq=0 for the emissions-based allocation rule whereas the output-based rule is given by
λe=0 and λq= E /q. (N.B.: The competitive assumption requires that firms take the subsidization rate as
given). Table 1 summarizes the associated first-order and equilibrium conditions of the decentralized
firm.
Table 1: First-order and equilibrium conditions of a decentralized firm in the closed trading system
Output-based rule (q-based) Emissions-based rule (e-based)
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By comparing the equilibrium conditions with the social optimum (2), we can immediately see
that the emissions-based rule warrants efficiency. The output-based rule, however, distorts specific
emissions and the output level: Here, the equilibrium output price equals marginal private costs.
Basically, the possibility of cutting emissions by a reduction of output is not taken into account. Due to
the presence of the output subsidy, the output level is larger compared to the efficient solution, qq > q*,
while the specific emissions are smaller, µq<µ* in order to achieve the required emission levels. As a
result, marginal cost of abatement will be higher.
Figure 1(a) illustrates the determination of specific emissions and output levels according to the
equilibrium conditions for both the output- and the emissions-based rule. Conditions for the latter rule
coincide with the social optimum. Figure 1(b) visualizes the welfare effects in the p-q diagram. Compared
to the social optimum, the welfare effects of the output-based rule are twofold: On the one hand, there is
some additional consumer surplus due to the increased production level (marked by “+“ in Figure 1(b)).
On the other hand, there is a loss of welfare due to the higher social cost of production (marked by “-“ in
Figure 1(b)).
6Figure 1: Implications of allocation schemes in the closed trading system
µ
q q
p
-
+
( ) ( )P q c µ=
qµ
qq qq
( )qc µ
* eq q=
( )*c µ
* eµ µ=
* eq q=
( ) ( )* * *'c cµ µ µ−
( ) ( ) ( )'P q c cµ µ µ= −
( )P q
E qµ=
(a) (b)
welfare gain
q-based
welfare loss
q-based
2.2 The Open System
We now turn to the case of a (small) open emission trading system where countries perceive a
fixed international market price τ for emission allowances. As a concrete example, the EU carbon trading
system envisaged under the EU Directive can be considered as an open system in which the single EU
country views the EU permit market as sufficiently large to take the permit price as exogenous.
Moreover, the EU market will be opened to non-EU regions rendering effectively fully elastic import
demand and export supply.
In the open system, the social planner maximizes overall welfare
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leading to the following first-order conditions:
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Again, we consider the welfare effects of output- and emission-based allocation rules. Here, the
first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing individual firm are identical to those in the closed system.
The equilibrium conditions, however, change, since the allowance price τ is fixed by the world market.
Table 2 summarizes the first-order and equilibrium conditions. Comparing the social optimum (5) with
the equilibrium conditions, we see that the specific emissions are not distorted if the allocation of
allowances is output-based. The output level, however, is chosen too high due to the subsidies on output.
Therefore, for output-based allocations, welfare losses occur only due to the distortion of output.
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Output-based rule (q-based) Emissions-based rule (e-based)
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For the emissions-based rule, however, there is an additional distortion of the specific emission
level: Due to the subsidies on emissions, specific emissions are chosen at a larger level than optimal. Note
that in the case, where µq< E , i.e. the country exports emissions allowances, the firms chooses the
maximal specific emissions (-c‘(µ)=0). As a result, the net effect on the choice of the output level is
ambiguous: On the one hand, the distortion of the specific emission rate induces an increase of the social
marginal production costs (c(µ)+τµ), thereby reducing the output level. On the other hand, the emissions-
based rule implicitly subsidizes output at the rate τ E /q, thereby increasing the output level. Welfare
losses can thus be decomposed in two components: (i) higher social costs per unit of output, (c(µ)+τµ),
and (ii) a distorted output level.
The choices of output and specific emissions for the social optimum as well as for emissions- and
output-based allocations are illustrated in Figure 2(a). Figure 2(b) visualizes the welfare losses for the
distortionary allocation rules. In our example, the implicit subsidies on output imply that output-levels are
too high for both allocation schemes.
In the open system, the excess costs that arise due to the use of output- or emissions-based
allocation schemes depend on the exogenous price for emission allowances. In order to study the
economic implications of changes in international permit prices, we first consider the aggregate emission
levels resulting in the respective cases and then assess the welfare effects. Straightforward differentiation
of the equilibrium conditions by τ yield the relationships as summarized in Table 3.
In the social optimum, it is obvious that total emissions decrease in τ. It becomes more and more
profitable to sell the allowances at the international market at price τ. For the output-based rule, total
emissions decrease if the country is a net buyer of allowances (µq> E ), whereas the change is ambiguous
if µq< E (which is likely for larger τ). For the emissions-based allocation rule, total emissions can only
decrease in τ if and only if the country is a net buyer of allowances. Thus, if for τ=0, the country is a net
buyer, it will remain a net buyer for all τ. Its total emissions converge to the emissions assignment E .
8Figure 2: Implications of allocation schemes in the open trading system
*qµ µ= ( )'cτ µ= −
( )* *c µ τµ+
( ) ( )P q c µ τµ= +
( )1 'E c
q
τ µ
µ
 
⋅ − = − 
 
eqeq
eµ ( )e ec µ τµ+
qqqq
( ) ( ) ( )EP q c
q
µ τ µ= + −
*q*q qq
µ p
Welfare loss e-based
Welfare loss q-based
Table 3: Sensitivity of emission and welfare w.r.t. the international permit price
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Referring to welfare, it is obvious that a country benefits from higher allowance prices in all three
cases if it is a net seller of allowances, but it suffers if it relies on buying allowances. As already
discussed, the specific allocation rule determines whether and at which international permit price the
switch from buying to selling allowances will occur. If allowances are free, i.e. τ=0, no distortions will
result from choosing emissions- or output-based rules. By continuity, for small exogenous emissions
prices, welfare losses due to the application of the two rules are small and similar. Towards larger τ,
however, the differences between the rules become more severe. Thus, assuming that at τ=0 the country
is a net buyer, the welfare levels will decrease in τ for small levels of τ in all three cases. For the social
optimum and the output-based rule, there will be a switch to selling allowances after which welfare will
increase. For the emissions-based rule, however, welfare will continue to decrease. Hence, even if for
9small levels of τ, the choice of the allocation scheme does not have severe welfare consequences, the
output-based rule will be favored towards higher emission prices.
3. Numerical General Equilibrium Analysis
The partial equilibrium analysis provides important insights into the economic incentives and
equilibrium implications for alternative allocation schemes. However, the framework is highly stylized to
keep analytical tractability. As soon as certain real-world complexities are taken into account, e.g. a more
detailed production structure or various market interactions, analytical solutions are no longer available
and numerical solutions methods are required. In this context, computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models have become the standard tool for applied analysis of measures in various policy domains. Its
main virtue is the micro-consistent representation of direct effects as well as of important indirect feed-
backs and spillovers induced by exogenous policy changes. The simultaneous explanation of the origin
and spending of the agents' income makes it possible to address both economy-wide efficiency as well as
distributional impacts of policy interference. In order to quantify the relevance of our analytical insights
and provide „real“ numbers for the policy debate, we employ a standard CGE model of open economies
(see e.g. Böhringer and Vogt 2003). A non-technical summary of the generic model structure and its
parameterization is provided below. The detailed algebraic exposition is presented in Appendix A.
3.1. Non-Technical Model Summary
Figure 3 provides a diagrammatic structure of a generic multi-sector open-economy model
designed for the investigation of economic impacts from carbon abatement policies. Primary factors of
region r include labor rL , capital rK and fossil-fuel resources
,ff rQ . Labor and capital are intersectorally
mobile within a region, but cannot move between regions. A specific resource is used in the production of
crude oil, coal and gas, resulting in upward sloping supply schedules.
Production Yir of commodities i in region r, other than primary fossil fuels, is captured by
aggregate production functions which characterize technology through substitution possibilities between
various inputs. Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions with three levels are
employed to specify the substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy
and non-energy, intermediate inputs, i.e. material. At the top level, non-energy inputs are employed in
fixed proportions with an aggregate of energy, capital and labor. At the second level, a CES function
describes the substitution possibilities between the energy aggregate and the aggregate of labor and
capital. Finally, at the third level, capital and labor trade off with a constant elasticity of substitution. As
to the formation of the energy aggregate, we allow sufficient levels of nesting to permit substitution
between primary energy types, as well as substitution between a primary energy composite and secondary
energy, i.e. electricity.
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In the production of fossil fuels, all inputs, except for the sector-specific fossil fuel
resource, are aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. At the top level, this aggregate
trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant elasticity of substitution.
The latter is calibrated in consistency with an exogenously given price elasticity of fossil fuel
supply.
Final demand Cr in each region is determined by a representative agent RAr, who
maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment. Total income of the
representative household consists of factor income and tax revenues. Final demand of the
representative agent is given as a CES composite which combines consumption of an energy
aggregate with a non-energy consumption bundle. Substitution patterns within the non-energy
consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-Douglas functions. The energy aggregate in final
demand consists of the various energy goods trading off at a constant elasticity of
substitution.
All goods used on the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond
to a CES composite Air of the domestically produced variety and a CES import aggregate Mir
of the same variety from the other regions, the so-called Armington good (Armington 1969).
Domestic production either enters the formation of the Armington good or is exported to
satisfy the import demand of other regions. The balance of payment constraint, which is
warranted through flexible exchange rates, incorporates the benchmark trade deficit or
surplus for each region.
3.2. Data and Calibration
In comparative-static CGE policy analysis, the effects of policy interference are
measured with respect to a reference situation – usually termed business-as-usual (BaU) –
where no policy changes apply. The reference situation is captured by economic transactions
in a particular benchmark year. As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis,
benchmark quantities and prices – together with exogenous elasticities (see Table A.6 in
Appendix A) – determine the parameters of the functional forms. For this model calibration,
we employ the GTAP-5E database which provides a consistent representation of energy
markets in physical units and detailed accounts of regional production and consumption as
well as bilateral trade flows for 23 commodities (sectors) and 50 regions (McDougall et al.
1998).
For our applied analysis of carbon abatement under alternative permit allocation
schemes, we have aggregated the 23 sectors into 10 composite sectors. Energy goods in the
model include primary energy carriers (coal (COL), gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU)) and
secondary energy carriers (refined oil products (OIL) and electricity (ELE)). This
disaggregation is essential in order to distinguish energy goods by carbon intensity and by the
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degree of substitutability. Moreover, we explicitly represent four energy-intensive (non-
energy) sectors that – in addition to the secondary energy carriers – are the prime candidates
for a restricted permit trading system (as is the case for the EU Directive on the European
carbon trading system). The remaining production and services are attributed to a composite
industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good (Y).
Table 4: Overview of sectors (commodities)
Sectors
Primary energy carriers
COL Coal
CRU Crude oil
GAS Natural gas
Energy-intensive sectors (EIS)
OIL Refined oil products
ELE Electricity
CHM Chemical products
ORE Iron and steel
PPP Paper, pulp, and printing
NFM Non-ferrous metals
Remaining manufactures and services
ROI Rest of Industry
With respect to the regional disaggregation, we restrict our core simulations to a
single-region open-economy setting (see section 5.3 for sensitivity analysis with respect to a
multi-lateral setting): Detailed domestic production and consumption patterns are described
for one region (selected from the set of 50 regions in the GTAP database) while the
representation of the Rest of the World is condensed by infinitely elastic export supply and
import demand. Thus, the single region is assumed to behave as price-taker on international
markets.
4. Scenario and Results
4.1. Scenarios
In our numerical simulations, we consider a single open economy that is committed to
some exogenous emission cutback relative to the benchmark emission level. To reflect the
broad range of alternative policy options, we distinguish six abatement scenarios four of
which consider an emissions trading system restricted to energy-intensive sectors. We are
then faced with the question of how many emission rights should be allocated to these
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sectors. In our simulations, we assume that total emission allowances for the restricted market
equal the emissions of these sectors that would occur in the presence of a uniform carbon tax
which constitutes their optimal emission level for a domestic abatement policy (see scenario
NTR). Revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits are rebated lump-sum to the
representative agent. Under the emission-based rule, allowances E are freely allocated to
energy-intensive sectors in proportion to their emissions. Under the output-based rule,
allowances E are freely allocated to energy-intensive sectors in proportion to their output
weighted with the sector-specific historical performance standard, i.e. the emission-output
ratio for the benchmark year.
The first set of two scenarios considers domestic action only:
• NTR: The government sets a uniform domestic carbon tax sufficiently high to meet the
national reduction targets. The NTR simulation reflects the cost-efficient policy if no
cross-border emissions trading is possible. It thus delivers a reference point for the
magnitude of efficiency gains from where-flexibility (addressed by the second set of
scenarios).
• DOMESTIC: Energy-intensive sectors form a restricted domestic permit market with
permits allocated across these sectors according to the output-based rule. This scenario
reflects the setting of a restricted domestic allowance trading system as analyzed in
section 2.1. The remaining segments of the economy are subject to a carbon tax that
warrants compliance with the overall domestic reduction target.
The second set of four scenarios takes into account international emissions trading
under alternative settings for trade-eligible sectors and permit allocation schemes:
• TRD: The government sets domestic carbon tax at the level of the international permit
price, selling emission rights in excess of the domestic reduction target or buying
emission rights to fulfill the emission reduction requirements. The TRD scenario provides
the overall cost-efficient solution.
The remaining three scenarios restrict international emissions trading to the energy-
intensive sectors and differ only with respect to the allocation of emission allowances in the
restricted permit market:
• AUCTION: Energy-intensive sectors must purchase all their emission rights at the
international market price and do not receive any revenue rebate.
• OUTPUT: The emission entitlements set aside by the domestic government are allocated
to the energy-intensive sectors according to the output-based rule.
• EMISSION: The emission entitlements set aside by the domestic government are
allocated to the energy-intensive sectors according to the emission-based rule.
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Table 5 summarizes the main characteristics of the abatement scenarios under
investigation.
Table 5: Overview of key scenarios
Scenario Regulation Scheme
EIS OTHER
International
Emissions
Trading
NTR CO2-Tax CO2-Tax No
DOMESTIC Permit Trade / output based rule CO2-Tax No
TRD Permit Trade / auctioned Permit Trade / auctioned Yes
AUCTION Permit / auctioned CO2-Tax Yes
OUTPUT Permit / emission based rule CO2-Tax Yes
EMISSION Permit / emission-based rule CO2-Tax Yes
4.2. Results
Simulation results are provided for the central case of Germany and an overall
cutback requirement of 20 % which roughly reflects the magnitude of Germany’s greenhouse
gas reduction target in the burden sharing agreement under the Kyoto Protocol (except that
we use emissions in 1998 as reference point instead of 1990).
4.2.1 Closed System
Table 6 summarizes the results for the two scenarios that refer to a closed system
without international trade of emission rights.
Table 6: Results for the closed trading system
Item / Scenario NTR DOMESTIC
Marginal abatement cost in $US/tC 68 ROE*:70 EIS: 123
Consumption (percent change from baseline) -0.22 -0.29
Output in EIS (percent change from baseline) -12.4 -3.8
Employment in EIS (percent change from baseline) -8.2 -0.1
Output in ROI (percent change from baseline) 0.6 -0.2
Employment in ROI (percent change from baseline) 1.1 0.1
• Includes ROI and final demand
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Under NTR, a uniform carbon tax of 70 USD/tC must be levied to effect an emission
cutback by 20 %. Imposition of the carbon tax induces adjustment of production and
consumption patterns to substitute away from carbon (by fuel-switching and energy savings).
For the NTR case, total adjustment costs – measured in terms of real consumption (income) –
amount to 0.22 % of the aggregate benchmark consumption value. Carbon taxes increase the
costs of production, particularly for the energy-intensive sectors in which energy represents a
significant share of direct and indirect costs. This leads to a distinct decline in aggregate
output and employment by 12.4 % and 8.2 % respectively.
Free allocation of emission allowances to energy-intensive sectors according to the
output-based rule (scenario DOMESTIC) drastically ameliorate the adverse impacts on
production and employment of these sectors: The decrease in aggregate EIS output only
amounts to a third of the NTR value, while employment losses are negligible (due to
additional substitution effects). Among EIS industries, production and employment gains
relative to the NTR case are largest for the electricity sector which is most subsidized because
of the highest carbon intensity. The benefits to employment and production in EIS goes at the
expense of ROI since the relative consumer prices under DOMESTIC are distorted in favor of
EIS.
The softening of structural change through the output subsidy to energy-intensive
production generates non-negligible efficiency losses: Economy-wide adjustment costs
increase by nearly a third from 0.22 % to 0.29 %. Under pure efficiency considerations, the
output subsidies to EIS trigger higher-than-optimal production of these sectors, which – in the
closed system - requires a lower emission rate to comply with the exogenously fixed emission
budget. The lower emission rate is reflected in the increased marginal abatement cost (123
$US/tC), i.e. higher marginal cost of control, for the restricted permit system vis-à-vis the
uniform carbon tax. To put it in a nutshell, the output-based rule shifts emission efforts
towards more costly emission rate reductions and away from less costly output reduction.
4.2.2 Open System
Cost-effectiveness of carbon abatement policies suggests the implementation of
emission reduction where it is cheapest. From an international perspective, this calls for an
open system with unrestricted where-flexibility through policy instruments such as emissions
trading or project-based bilateral abatement activities (such as Joint Implementation (JI) and
the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM)). The recent climate policy process has
effectively rendered comprehensive where-flexibility a conditio-sine-qua-non for the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. It seems politically unfeasible that national
governments could defend abatement policies within a closed system imposing potentially
high excess costs to regulated domestic parties due to foregone gains from where-flexibility.
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Most policy-relevant are, therefore, the economic implications of allowance
allocation schemes in an open system. For example, the EU directive on emissions trading
between the EU’s energy-intensive industries envisages a link with other (non-EU) trading
schemes and project-based measures like JI and CDM under the Kyoto Protocol.
To visualize the sensitivity of economic effects with respect to the level of the
international permit price, we revert to a graphical exposition of results where results are
plotted as a function of the international permit price ranging from 10 $US up to 300 $US per
ton of carbon.
We start the discussion of results with the policy-induced adjustment of aggregate
production in energy-intensive industries. In Figure 4, we see that both distortionary
allocation schemes (OUTPUT, EMISSION) avoid a stronger decline in EIS production
because of the associated output subsidies.
Figure 4: Output effects for energy-intensive industries
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Compared to the efficient decline in EIS production under the AUCTION case for a
restricted trading system or the comprehensive trading case (scenario TRD), the “optimal”
production adjustment becomes dramatically distorted towards higher international permit
prices under output- or emission-based allocation: From an efficiency point of view, it would
be desirable to gradually cut back energy-intensive production towards higher permit prices
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in order to exploit gains from selling domestic emission allowance; the output subsidies,
however, directly override this incentive.
Figure 5 illustrates the implications on emission rates of energy-intensive industries.
The graph confirms the key mechanisms of the output- and emission-based rules as laid out in
the partial equilibrium analysis of section 2. The efficient emission rate declines rather
strongly with the international permit price, reflecting the attractiveness of emission rate
reduction to benefit either from reduced expenditures on import sales or higher revenues from
permit exports. While the output-based rule warrants the socially efficient emission rate
(there are only very small deviations due to general equilibrium feed-back effects), the
emission rate under the emission-based rule is dramatically higher because of the additional
input subsidization of emission use in EIS sectors.
Figure 5: Emission rates in energy-intensive sectors
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Based on Figures 4 and 5, the implications for emissions trading - depicted in Figure
6 - are straightforward. Across all scenarios, exports of emission permits increase towards
higher international prices, which indicates the increased economic incentive of domestic
emission abatement in energy-intensive industries eligible for carbon trade. However, the
concrete trajectories for carbon trade are quite different. Compared to the scenarios
AUCTION and TRD where permits are auctioned, the import level of carbon is always too
high – likewise, the level of exports is too low – under OUTPUT and EMISSION.
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Figure 6: Emission trade
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In general, the switch from importing permits to exporting permits takes place when
the international permit price increases from below to above the autarky marginal abatement
costs effectively perceived by the industries. This change in the trade position requires
substantially higher international permit prices for the OUTPUT scenario because of
subsidized domestic production. Under EMISSION, not only is the domestic production too
high from an efficiency point of view, but the emission rate is too. As a consequence, the
emission-based allocation scenario stands out for way too much domestic emissions vis-à-vis
the efficient level. In fact, as has been laid out in the analytical exposition of sector 2, the
emission-based allocation scheme implies a permanent carbon importing position where total
domestic emissions of energy-intensive industries stay (asymptotically) above the total
emission allowance. Clearly, this imposes very high excess costs towards increasing
international permit prices because of larger foregone gains from permit trade.
The efficiency costs of distortionary allocation schemes are displayed in Figure 7.
For the above reasoning, EMISSION is the sole scenario that exhibits steadily increasing
adjustment costs in the international permit price. The shape of the TRD and AUCTION
curves are straightforward from economic textbook intuition. The abating economy benefits
from reduced adjustment costs vis-à-vis the NTR case whenever the international permit price
differs from the autarky marginal abatement costs.
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Figure 7: Adjustment cost
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If the international permit price falls below the autarky marginal abatement cost, the
economy is better off with imports that replace more costly domestic emission reduction. If
the international permit price is above the autarky marginal abatement cost, the economy
benefits from revenues of permit exports that exceed the costs of domestic abatement.
In qualitative terms, the scenario OUTPUT exhibits the same characteristics as
AUCTION or TRD; however, the induced welfare loss from output subsidization exceeds the
gains from permit trade over a larger range of international permit prices.
Finally, we turn to the employment impacts that – in policy practice - might
constitute the central trade-off with pure efficiency considerations. In Figure 8, we see that
the distortionary allocation schemes do offset to a large extent the adverse employment
impacts of emission constraints for the energy-intensive sectors. Yet, this compensation to the
labor force in EIS sectors comes at increasing efficiency costs towards higher international
permit prices, particularly for the case of emission-based allowance allocation.
When we cross-compare the two distortionary allocation schemes, the most important
insight from our numerical analysis is that the output-based rule not only induces
substantially lower efficiency losses than the emission-based rule but also performs better
with respect to the compensating objectives in production and employment. The main reason
is that real disposable income is higher under the less distortionary output-based rule. Thus,
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consumption demand for final goods, including EIS, is higher inducing higher production and
employment levels.
Figure 8: Employment in energy-intensive industries
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As to ROI, production and employment under TRD and AUCTION increase
monotonically towards higher international permit prices because the cost advantage for non-
energy intensive production and services becomes more and more pronounced. If permits are
freely allocated to EIS under EMISSION or OUTPUT, structural change towards ROI is
substantially weakened; the production and employment “gap” for ROI between the efficient
abatement policies (TRD and AUCTION) and the inefficient policies (EMISSION and
OUTPUT) widens more and more towards higher international permit prices.
5. Sensitivity Analysis
To evaluate the sensitivity of our results we have run additional simulations for
alternative assumptions on (i) the emission reduction target, (ii) benchmark data, and (iii) the
international dimension of abatement policies. We find that all of our insights based on the
central case simulations remain robust.
5.1. Reduction Targets
More stringent abatement targets increase the adjustment costs for all abatement
scenarios, i.e. the curves displayed in Figure 7 move downwards (likewise upwards for
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relaxed targets). In the open trading system, the excess costs of both distortionary allocation
rules, however, decrease towards higher reduction targets. The reason is that the total amount
of emission allowances being freely allocated to energy-intensive industries declines and,
thus, reduces the effective subsidy. Figure 9 illustrates the efficiency differences between
OUTPUT and EMISSION for alternative targets ranging from 5 % to 30 % emission
reduction vis-à-vis the benchmark emission level. Likewise, EIS output and employment
gains of the output-based rule compared to the emission-based rule decrease towards higher
reduction targets, i.e. smaller amounts of freely allocated permits.
Figure 9: Efficiency gap between OUTPUT and EMISSION
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It should be noted that in the closed system with endogenous allowance prices the
tightening of reduction targets produces two effects working in opposite directions. On the
one hand, the shadow price of carbon emissions will increase, hereby augmenting the implicit
subsidy to energy-intensive industries; on the other hand, the decline in freely allocated
emission allowances will decrease the subsidy: Figure B.1 in Appendix B visualizes the
aggregate impact on adjustment costs and EIS employment for the German economy:
Towards higher reduction targets the excess costs of the output-based rule (scenario
DOMESTIC) increase vis-à-vis the NTR scenario while the relative employment losses
decrease.
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5.2. Benchmark Data
In order to investigate the robustness of results with respect to the underlying
benchmark data, we have conducted simulations based for a number of industrialized
countries. Figures B.2.1-B.2.6 in Appendix B visualize the results for the U.S., Japan, Great
Britain, France, Spain, and Italy reflecting a 20 % emission cutback compared to the
respective benchmark emission level. All of our insights from the core simulation remain
robust.
5.3. Multilateral Abatement
In our core simulations, we have considered unilateral abatement policies by a small
open economy. To gain insights how equivalent abatement policies by major trading partners
affect our results, we have set-up a 2-region model variant with bilateral trade where both
regions (here: Germany and the remaining aggregate of EU-15) undertake identical
abatement policies. As illustrated by Figures 10 and 11, endogenisation of terms-of-trade for
multilateral abatement policies produces only second-order effects that do not change the
findings from the small open economy setting.
Figure 10: Adjustment costs for the German economy for multilateral abatement policies
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Figure 11: Employment in energy-intensive German industries for multilateral abatement
policies
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6. Conclusions
Environmental regulation schemes often entail some type of compensation to reduce
the specific costs for regulated industries. Since compensating mechanisms typically aim at
the reduction of adverse production and employment effects in these industries, there is an
inherent trade-off for environmental policy between the issue of efficiency and compensation.
We have analyzed this trade-off for tradable permit systems with free initial
allocation of emission allowances based on either emissions or output. Combining theoretical
partial equilibrium analysis with numerical general equilibrium analysis, we find that the
trade-off between efficiency and compensation in open trading systems crucially depends on
the level of the international permit price. The efficiency costs for ameliorating adverse
production and output effects in energy-intensive industries through output-based or
emission-based allocation becomes more costly, the higher the international permit price is.
The costs reflect foregone gains from permit trading because of permit imports that are too
high or, likewise, permit exports that are too small compared to the efficient volumes under
auctioned permit systems.
In the open trading system, the output-based allocation rule is distinctly less costly
than the emission-based rule to preserve output and employment in energy-intensive sectors.
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Emission-based allocation is particularly expensive towards higher international permit prices
where the implicit subsidies for emission use in energy-intensive sectors produce drastic
efficiency losses since they imply high expenditures for carbon permit imports rather than
high net revenues from efficient carbon permit exports. Only for small international permit
prices is there a relatively small gap in cost-effectiveness (i.e. efficiency costs for reduced
production or employment frictions) between the output- and emission-based rule.
This leads us to our final policy conclusions with respect to the current discussion of
emissions trading schemes under the Kyoto Protocol. The international permit price of a
broader emission trading system is likely to be very small after accounting for U.S.
withdrawal and large amounts of hot air by the Former Soviet Union. Therefore, the
efficiency costs of an output-based allocation can be expected to be relatively small for the
Kyoto commitment period, while the political economy benefits with respect to political
acceptance might be rather large. Thus, our analysis confirms the broader rationale for an
output-based free (initial) allocation of emission allowances. However, we also clearly show
that the costs of compensation can increase substantially in future commitment periods where
emission reduction constraints and implied emission permit prices are likely to be much
higher. In designing a longer-term trading scheme, policy makers should therefore credibly
announce transition to non-distortionary auctioning of emission allowances.
There are various potentially important aspects missing from our investigation.
Climate policy in OECD countries is not a green field. Several initiatives to reduce
anthropogenic carbon emissions ranging from command-and-control (such as insulation
standards) and voluntary agreements to tax instruments (such as energy taxes) co-exist. The
design of (restricted) trading schemes must account for pre-existing regulation to avoid
inefficiencies and multiple regulation of economic agents. Furthermore, the free choice of
alternative allocation schemes across regions can create strong incentives for strategic
environmental policy. For example, EU member countries under the EU Directive can
determine the amount of emission rights and the specific allocation rules to energy-intensive
industries in order to improve competitiveness of domestic influential branches. We plan to
address these issues in future research.
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Appendix A: Algebraic Model Summary
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for our
comparative-static model designed to investigate the economic implications of alternative
allowance allocation rules. For the generic model the following assumptions apply:
• Nested separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions characterize the use
of inputs in production. All production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. Goods are
produced with capital, labor, energy and material (KLEM).
• A representative agent (RA) in each region is endowed with three primary factors: natural
resources (used for fossil fuel production), labor and capital. The RA maximizes utility
from consumption of a CES composite subject to a budget constraint with fixed
investment demand (i.e. fixed demand for the savings good). The aggregate consumption
bundle combines demands for fossil fuels, electricity and non-energy commodities. Total
income of the RA consists of factor income and taxes (including revenues from carbon
taxes or auctioned carbon permits).
• Supplies of labor, capital and fossil-fuel resources are exogenous. Labor and capital are
mobile within domestic borders but cannot move between regions; natural resources are
sector specific.
• All goods are differentiated by region of origin. Constant elasticity of transformation
functions (CET) characterize the differentiation of production between production for the
domestic markets and the export markets. Regarding imports, nested CES functions
characterize the choice between imported and domestic varieties of the same good
(Armington).
• Goods from regions which are not explicitly represented (rest of the world – ROW) are
differentiated, and a set of horizontal export demand and import supply functions
determine the trade between ROW and the regions whose production and consumption
patterns are described in detail. In other words, the representation of ROW is reduced to
import and export flows with the explicit regions of the model where the latter are
assumed to be price-takers with respect to ROW import and export prices.
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear inequalities. These inequalities
correspond to two classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit and market clearance. The
fundamental unknowns of the system are two vectors: activity levels and prices. In
equilibrium, each of these variables is linked to one inequality condition: an activity level to a
zero-profit condition and a commodity (factor) price to a market-clearance condition.
In the algebraic exposition below, the notation zirΠ is used to denote the (zero-)profit
function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned to the associated production
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activity. Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides
compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotellings’s lemma), which appear
subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We use i (aliased with j) as an index for
commodities (sectors) and r (aliased with s) as an index for regions. The label EG represents
the set of energy goods and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels. Tables A.1 – A.6
explain the notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition.
Figures A.1 – A.5 provide a graphical exposition of the production and final consumption
structure.
A.1 Zero Profit Conditions
1. Production of goods except fossil fuels:
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where irY ( i ff∉ ) is the associated activity variable.
2. Production of fossil fuels:
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where irY ( i ff∈ ) is the associated activity variable.
3. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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where irE is the associated activity variable.
4. Armington aggregate:
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where irA is the associated activity variable.
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5. Aggregate imports across import regions:
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where irM is the associated activity variable.
6. Household consumption aggregate:
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where rC is the associated activity variable.
7. Household energy aggregate:
, ,
1
0FF C FF C
i FF
1-1-E E AE
iCrCr irCr = -p p
σ σθ
∈
  ≤  Π
where CrE is the associated activity variable.
8. Investment:
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where rI is the associated activity variable.
A.2 Market Clearance Conditions
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where rw is the associated price variable.
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where rν is the associated price variable.
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11. Natural resources:
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where irq is the associated price variable.
12. Output for internal markets:
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13. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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14. Import aggregate:
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where Mirp is the associated price variable.
15. Armington aggregate:
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where Airp is the associated price variable.
16. Investment aggregate:
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where Irp is the associated price variable.
17. Household consumption:
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where Crp is the associated price variable.
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18. Aggregate household energy consumption:
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where ECrp is the associated price variable.
19. Carbon emissions:
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where 2COrp is the associated price variable.
20. Balance of payments:
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where Wp is the associated price variable.
Table A.1: Sets
i Sectors and goods
j Aliased with i
r Regions
s Aliased with r
EG All energy goods: Coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: Coal, crude oil and gas
LQ Liquid fuels: Crude oil and gas
Table A.2: Activity variables
irY Production in sector i and region r
irE Aggregate energy input in sector i and region r
irM Aggregate imports of good i and region r
irA Armington aggregate of good i in region r
rC Aggregate household consumption in region r
CrE Aggregate household energy consumption in region r
rI Aggregate investment in region r
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Table A.3: Price variables
pir Output price of good i produced in region r for domestic market
Wp Real exchange rate with the rest of the world (ROW)
pEir Price of aggregate energy in sector i and region r
pMir Import price aggregate for good i imported to region r
A
irp Price of Armington good i in region r
pC
r
Price of aggregate household consumption in region r
pECr Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region r
I
rp Price of aggregate investment good in region r
rw Wage rate in region r
rv Price of capital services in region r
irq Rent to natural resources in region r (i ∈ FF)
2CO
rp Shadow price of CO2 unit in region r
Table A.4: Cost shares
XROW
irθ Share of ROW exports in sector i and region r
jirθ Share of intermediate good j in sector i and region r (i∉FF)
KLE
irθ Share of KLE aggregate in sector i and region r (i∉FF)
E
irθ Share of energy in the KLE aggregate of sector i and region r (i∉FF)
T
irα Share of labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and region r (i∉FF)
Q
irθ Share of natural resources in sector i of region r (i∈FF)
FF
Tirθ Share of good i (T=i) or labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and
region r (i∈FF)
θ COAir Share of coal in fossil fuel demand by sector i in region r (i∉FF)
θ ELEir Share of electricity in energy demand by sector i in region r
jirβ Share of liquid fossil fuel j in energy demand by sector i in region r(i∉FF, j∈LQ)
θ Misr Share of imports of good i from region s to region r
MROW
irθ Share of ROW imports of good i in region r
θ Air Share of domestic variety in Armington good i of region r
32
θ ECr Share of fossil fuel composite in aggregate household consumption in
region r
I
irθ Share of good i in investment composite in region r
irγ Share of non-energy good i in non-energy household consumptiondemand in region r
θ EiCr Share of fossil fuel i in household energy consumption in region r
Table A.5: Endowments and emissions coefficients
Lr Aggregate labor endowment for region r
rK Aggregate capital endowment for region r
irQ Endowment of natural resource i for region r (i∈FF)
Br Balance of payment deficit or surplus in region r (note: 0=
r
rB )
2CO r Endowment of carbon emission rights in region r
2CO
ia Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i (i∈FF)
Table A.6: Elasticities
η Transformation between production for the domestic market
and production for the export
2
KLEσ Substitution between energy and value-added in production(except fossil fuels)
0.8
iQ,σ Substitution between natural resources and other inputs in
fossil fuel production calibrated consistently to exogenous
supply elasticities FFµ .
µCOA=0.5
µCRU=1.0
µGAS =1.0
ELEσ Substitution between electricity and the fossil fuel aggregate in
production
0.3
COAσ Substitution between coal and the liquid fossil fuel composite
in production
0.5
Aσ Substitution between the import aggregate and the domestic
input
4
Mσ Substitution between imports from different regions 8
ECσ Substitution between the fossil fuel composite and the non-fossil fuel consumption aggregate in household consumption
0.8
CFF ,σ Substitution between fossil fuels in household fossil energy
consumption
0.3
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Figure A.1: Nesting in non-fossil fuel production
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Figure A.2: Nesting in fossil fuel production
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Figure A.3: Nesting in household consumption
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Figure A.4: Nesting in Armington production
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Figure A.5: Nesting in import aggregate
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A.3 Implementation of Allowance Allocation Rules
In our simulations on alternative allowance allocation rules, the price of a unit of CO2
for an industry i or the household C depends on (i) whether we consider an open trading
system or a closed trading system, and (ii) whether the respective segment of the economy is
eligible for carbon trade (denoted T ). To distinguish carbon prices by sector, we must
explicitly account for carbon demands within the zero-profit conditions characterizing the
sector-specific energy aggregate and the household energy aggregate (instead of the
Armington aggregate). Carbon demands by segments i or C then reads as:
2 22 ( )
E
ir
ir ir CO CO
j ff jr j jr
CO = E
p a p∈
∂ Π
∂ +
and 2 22 ( )
C
r
Cr Cr CO CO
j ff jr j jr
CO = E
p a p∈
∂ Π
∂ +
.
A.3.1 Closed System
For the closed system, the market clearance conditions that determine the carbon
prices for segments z ( { , }z i C∈ ) can be written as:
2 2
T
r zr
z T
CO CO
∈
≥ and 2 2 2
T
r r zr
z T
CO CO CO
∉
− ≥ ,
where 2
T
rCO ( 0 2 2Tr rCO CO< < ) denotes the amount of emission allowances set aside for
the segments forming part of the trading system (T).
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A.3.2 Open System
For the open system, allowances can be traded internationally at an exogenous world
market price. In the algebraic formulation, two additional zero profit conditions must be
added to specify carbon import activities 2COzrIM and carbon export activities
2CO
zrEX for
segments z of the economy that are open to international trade ( z T∈ ):
2W CO
zrep p≥ (imports) and 2CO Wzrp ep≤ (exports)
where Wep denotes the international price for a unit of CO2 in domestic currency. Revenues
from exports of emission allowances or, likewise, expenditures for imports of carbon
emission rights enter the balance of payment constraints.
In the open system, the market clearance condition for those segments that form part
of allowance trading reads as:
( )2 2Tr zr zr zr
z T
CO CO IM EX
∈
≥ + − .
A.3.3 Allocation of Allowances
We distinguish three rules how emission allowances are assigned to different
segments of the economy: (i) auctioning, (ii) emission-based assignment, and (iii) output-
based assignment. Our exposition of generic equilibrium conditions in sections A.2 and A.3
cover the case of (non-distortionary) auctioning. Under emission-based or output-based
assignment, the value of freely allocated emission rights constitutes a subsidy that enters the
zero-profit condition of sectoral production.
For the output-based rule, where allowances per-unit of output are allocated to
eligible sectors in proportion to the benchmark emission intensity ir
ir
E
Y
the implicit ad-
valorem output subsidy sir can be written as:
2( ) /Y ir COir r ir ir
ir
E
s p p
Y
λ≥ ,
where
Y
rλ denotes the endogenous average emission assignment factor per unit of output.
This factor is determined by the associated “emission budget” constraint:
2
YT ir
r r ir
iri T
ECO Y
Y
λ
∈
≥  .
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For the emission-based rule, where allowances per-unit of output are allocated to
eligible sectors in proportion to their emissions 2irCO the equivalent input subsidy irτ r reads
as:
E
ir rτ λ= ,
where
E
rλ denotes the endogenous average emission assignment factor per unit of emission.
This factor is determined by the associated “emission budget” constraint:
2 2
ET
r r ir
i T
CO COλ
∈
≥  .
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Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis
B.1 Reduction Targets – Closed System Case
Figure B.1a: Adjustment cost – Germany (DEU)
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Figure B.1b: Employment in energy-intensive industries – Germany (DEU)
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B.2 Benchmark Data
Figure B.2.1a: Adjustment cost - USA
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Figure B.2.1b: Employment in energy-intensive industries - USA
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Figure B.2.2a: Adjustment cost - Japan (JPN)
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
10 50 100 150 200 250 300
Co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
(in
%
fro
m
Ba
U)
International permit price in $US/tC
Adjustment cost - JPN
NTR
OUTPUT
TRD
EMISSION
AUCTION
Figure B.2.2b: Employment in energy-intensive industries - Japan (JPN)
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Figure B.2.3a: Adjustment cost – Great Britain (GBR)
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Figure B.2.3b: Employment in energy-intensive industries – Great Britain (GBR)
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Figure B.2.4a: Adjustment cost - France (FRA)
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Figure B.2.4b: Employment in energy-intensive industries – France (FRA)
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Figure B.2.5a: Adjustment cost – Spain (ESP)
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
10 50 100 150 200 250 300
Co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
(in
%
fro
m
Ba
U)
International permit price in $US/tC
Adjustment cost - ESP
NTR
OUTPUT
TRD
EMISSION
AUCTION
Figure B.2.5b: Employment in energy-intensive industries – Spain (ESP)
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Figure B.2.6a: Adjustment cost – Italy (ITA)
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Figure B.2.6b: Employment in energy-intensive industries – Italy (ITA)
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